Starrett has made a significant contribution to our understanding of the mathematics of el(ternalities, 1 but the nonconvexity which he identifies has a remedy in law. The mechanism by which the Jaw circumvents this non· convexity has gone unnoticed in the literature, as evidenced by a recent exchange in this Journal.' This note relates nonconvexity to the law of liability.
THE PROBLEM
We shall identify the nonconvexity by recalling Arrow's formulation of a market for externalities and then de-~ribing the remcdy. 3 Let y ,~ be the ilh firm's net supply of the kth good, where i = I, 2, ... , m and k = I, 2, ... , n. Let Yl•< indicate the net supply of all firms except the ith: Yl•< = ( Yu , ... , YC, Y(i+ih , ... , Ym 11 ) . Externality js indicated by a production function whose arguments include the net supply of other firms: 0 -;,. f' (y,. , ... , y,.; n,t). Arrow defines a variable y,,. which may be described as j's I David Starrett, Fundan1ental non-convexi1ies in the theory of externalities, J. Econ. 71uwry 4 (1972), 180-199. a In an exchange on the Coase theorem, the Editors of th is Journal remark that Starrett bas shown that there are "non-convexities inherent in the problein of exten)al diseconomies, The equivalence relation is interpreted by Arrow as the market clearing condition for observations. Obviously there is bilateral monopoly in these markets, so competitive behavior is not to be anticipated; Starrett observed that there is also a nonconvexity. The difficulty is that externalities can be observed beyond the point where own production is nil, as indicated by the example of the laundry and smoke in Fig. I . Equilibrium may fail to exist in the market for observations of smoke because of this nonconvexity. 
Tllll LIABILITY SOLUTION
The institutional problem is to eliminate the extemality by a mechanism which can distinguish between global and local optima. The courts can solve this problem by assigning liability rights according to a calculation of benefits and costs, as we shall show for the laundry and srnokey electric c-0mpany. Benefits and costs are measured by the profit functions for the two firms. The cost of pollution is the minimum loss in profits to the laundry caused by the smoke, or the loss when the laundry maximizes profits, written 11'(p, 0) -11 1 (p, y,J.' If the electric company is liable for the full cost of smoke, then its profit net of compensation is'
The term w'(p, 0) is constant, so the electric company is maximizing joiot profits as it would if the firms merged . Thus the externality is intcrnaliu<I. The joint maximization problem exhibits Starrett's nonconvexity, as illus· trated in Fig. 2 , but it is likely that the electric coropaoy will be able to identify the global maximum if the laundry divulges information about profits.
• Starrett was concerned that the pollutee (laundry) might supply an infinite number of pollution rights to a competitive market, but this problem does not arise under liability. The laundry may sell its legal claim for compensation by signing a contract which waives its right to recover damages. We may descri be this transaction as selling coupons granting their owner the right to pollute. The laundry moves down the production frontier as it sells coupons to the electric company, until further damages are impossible. The rjght to recover further dan1ages is ,vorthless in the oonconvex region, because further damages arc nil. In effect, the electric company must pay a positive price for coupons up to the point where the landry can sustain no further damages, and then the price becomes nil. Exchange of pollution rights is not competitive under u,e liability solution, because the price varies with the quantity.
• Jt is essential for econo1nic efficiency to compensate for the minio,uo, profit loss, One source of confusion concerns whether the electric company will have enough profits to compensate the laundry. This is a question of whether quasi-rents are adequate in the short run, or rents are adequate in the long run. The solution is essentially the same in both cases; we shall explain the long-nm case. In the long run the electric company's profits net of compensation are nonnegative because it can produce zero output and pay no compensation : -F. 1 ;;;;,. 0. In other words the electric company's rent is a lways sufficient to compensate for the laundry's lost rent at the optimum. The rule of pollutor liability creates sufficient rent for efficient compensation.
l.oCATION
Another source of confusion concerns the optimal location of plants. Locational choice docs not change the essential nature of the problem, but it increases the computational difficulties. Let z, be a variable indicating the site chosen for plant r and let w(z,) be the corresponding rent. Location affects production by changing the transportation inputs needed for a particular output. Furthermore, the amount of smoke observed by the laundry y,;, depends upon the electric company's emissions y,., and the location of the plants: Y,;., = y, 1 . .(z, , z 1 , y,. ). Thus the laundry solves ,,,., = max L PkYik -w(z,) ,.,,, k s.t. f'(y, ~ zi ; Yii,(z, , Z;, Y1,)) ~ 0.
Under full liability, the electric company solves
The electric c-0mpany is choosing net supplies and location to maximize joint profits, as required for social efficiency, but the computations are difficult when location is a choice variable. Efficiency requires that compensation be based upon the losses which the laundry would suffer when its location maximizes its profits. The electric company and the courts may have difficulty distinguishing between losses at the laundry's actual location and hypothetical losses at its ideal location.
There is an added difficulty in identifying the global maximum, due to a locational nonconvexity which is different from Starrett's nonconvexity'. Suppose that the laundry and electric company arc located far apart, and the production set is convex over the region where laundry is produced in positive quantities, as shown in Fig. 3 . As the laundry changes its location and moves closer to the electric company, the production frontier dips toward the origin for all interior points, as shown, which indicates that smoke is interfering more with laundry production. J-lowcvcr, the comers of the frontier are unaltered. If this process continues as the laundry is moved ever c)oser, the production frontier's interior eventually becomes nonconvex, as shown. 
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ROBERT D. COOTER the courts overcome limited information by a sequence of court decisions which converge to the optimum, but convergence assu1ncs full convexicy, which is absent in our case.
• Consequently, it would be desirable if efficiency could be achieved by private bargaining, irrespective of the law·s structure, as postulated by the Coase theorem.
• Even in the two-person case, the namre of bargaining is such that efficient or group rational outcomes cannot be anticipated with confidence. For example, the parties may fail to agree because each holds out for more than half of the surplus from cooperation. lo such a strategic setting, the electric company may be unable to extract the i11formation needed to distinguish between global and local maxima. The likelihood of efficiency is still lower when there are several pollutors and pollutees, a ll of whom must become parties to the bargain.
How does the existence of several pollutors or pllucees influence the liability solution? The essential nature of the problem is unchanged when there a re several laundries and a single electric company, which corresponds to class action against a single dcfendent. Adding additional terms to the joint profit function requires the electric company to have more information, but the nature of its maximization problem is unchanged. However, adding several electric companies creates serious difficulties for the full liability solution. The courts would need to compute the global optimum in order to divide damages among the pollutors in a way which would achieve efficiency. It would be difficult for the courts to make such a computation.••
